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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT C. DAVIS,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

v.

s

DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al.,

:

Defendants-Appellees

Case No* 920254-CA
Priority 16

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992),
providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original jurisdiction."

Accordingly, the defendants-

appellees have filed a motion to transfer this appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court in accordance with U. R. App. P. 44.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether a direct appeal from an agency order to an

appellate court is the exclusive means of judicial review of
Davis's constitutional challenge to a pending formal adjudicative
proceeding

against

him

in

the

Division

of

Occupational

&

Professional Licensing?
Standard of Review:

This is a question of statutory

interpretation, a question of law that should be reviewed for
correctness. Ward v. Richfield Citv, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
1

2.

Whether a collateral attack on a pending formal

adjudicative proceeding of a state agency should be barred for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies?
Standard

of

Review:

Absent

a

statutory

provision

requiring or waiving exhaustion, a decision to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Diet., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th
Cir. 1992); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550,
1556-57 (11th Cir. 1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated March 23,
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, dismissing an action by a
licensed medical doctor against the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing (the Division or DOPL). Plaintiff sought to
enjoin pending disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground
that they were unconstitutional. The district court ruled that the
proper procedure for such a challenge was by direct appeal from the
administrative proceedings to an appellate court.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 22, 1991. In
December 1991, the Division filed a motion to dismiss. After oral
argument, the Court issued a memorandum decision granting the
Division's

motion.

An

order

dismissing

the

complaint

with

prejudice was signed and entered on March 23, 1992. The notice of

2

appeal was filed on April 20, 1992.
Statement of Facts
In December

1989, the Division of Occupational and

Professional Licensing initiated formal proceedings against Robert
C. Davis, a medical doctor licensed in Utah, to sanction Davis for
alleged violations of the Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
58-12-26

to

-43,

including

fraudulent

billing,

rendering

unnecessary medical treatment and tests, making false diagnoses,
inappropriate

sexual

overprescribing drugs.

conduct

with

R. 3, 35-99.

patients

and

staff,

and

Davis had previously been

placed on probation by the Division until July 1992 and the
Division also alleged he had violated the terms of his probation.
R. 5, 36-37.

Thereafter, Davis filed this action in the district

court seeking to enjoin the disciplinary proceedings on the ground
that the proceedings violated his due process rights under the
fifth and fourteen amendments to the United States Constitution and
article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution for three reasons:
(1) the Director of the Division was allegedly biased against
Davis, (2) the Director was statutorily vested with investigative,
prosecutorial and adjudicative powers, and (3) the Division had
instituted the proceedings without prior notice to Davis that it
considered him in violation of the terms of his probation.

R. 2-

10.
In response to Davis's complaint, the Division filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that Davis had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies.

3

R. 24-34.

After full

briefing

and

Division's

oral

argument,

motion,

constitutional

holding

the
that

district

court

granted

the

Davis

should

raise

his

challenges on direct appeal

from the Division

proceedings as provided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
SS 63-64b-l to -22 (1989)-1

R. 136-38, 141-42.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Davis's declaratory judgment action in the district court
challenging the constitutionality of the Division's disciplinary
proceedings against him was precluded by the Utah Administrative
Procedures

Act

which

governs

judicial

x

review

of

all

agency

In section A of his statement of facts, and at various points
throughout his brief, including addenda D, E, F and G, Davis refers
to his federal court action to enjoin the administrative
proceedings. These are improper references to matters outside the
record and should be stricken or disregarded under Rule 24(k) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Moreover, Davis's
unsuccessful federal court action is immaterial to any of the
issues properly before the court, Davis's persistent efforts to
derail the pending administrative proceedings do not enhance the
merits of his legal arguments.
Similarly, in section B of his statement of facts and at
various points throughout his brief, including addenda H, I, and J,
Davis refers to his motion to dismiss filed in the Division
proceedings and the administrative law judge's ruling denying that
motion. Those matters are also both irrelevant and outside the
record on appeal.
Therefore, they should also be stricken or
disregarded under U. R. App. P. Rule 24(k). If the Court does
consider
them,
however,
it
should
note
that
Davis's
characterization of the ALJ's ruling is inaccurate and misleading.
Judge Eklund did not suggest that Davis file a collateral action in
state district court to enjoin the administrative proceedings.
Rather, Judge Eklund merely responded to the request of Davis's
counsel for a stay of the administrative proceedings in order to
file such an action: "But it seems to me, in requesting me to stay
this proceeding, it would have been more appropriate to have
already filed that action and have taken the steps to pursue that
remedy before you ask me to stay this proceeding now."
Davis
Brief, Addendum I at 2. Thus, the suggestion that an action should
be filed in state district court was that of Davis's own counsel,
not the ALJ.

4

adjudicative proceedings, unless otherwise expressly provided by
statute.

Thus, the district court properly dismissed Davis's

complaint as a matter of law*
Even if the district court had discretion to review
Davis's claim, it properly exercised that discretion here to
require

Davis

to

exhaust

his

administrative

remedies.

The

statutory scheme for judicial review of agency orders provides an
adequate means of reviewing Davis's constitutional claims.
will

not

suffer any substantial

irreparable harm

Davis

from being

required to raise those claims on direct appeal from an agency
order

and

the

public

interest

in

going

forward

with

the

disciplinary proceedings far outweighs any harm caused to Davis by
requiring exhaustion*
The district court properly dismissed Davis's complaint
and the judgment should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UAPA PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DOPL'S ACTION
AGAINST DAVIS'S LICENSE TO PRACTICE
MEDICINE
Davis brought his complaint against the Division under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 to -13
(1992), which grants the district courts jurisdiction to "declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed."

R. 2.

The Declaratory Judgments

Act, however, must be read with the Utah Administrative Procedures

5

Act,

Utah

Code Ann.

§§

63-46b-l

to

-22

(1989

& Supp.

1991)

("UAPA")2, which provides:
Except as set forth in Subsection (2),
and except as otherwise provided by a statute
superseding provisions of this chapter by
explicit reference to this chapter, the
provisions of this chapter apply to every
agency of the state of Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions
that determine the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one or more
identifiable persons, including all
agency actions to grant, deny,
revoke, suspend, modify, annul,
withdraw, or amend an authority
right, or license; and
(b) judicial
such actions.

review

of

all

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).

The

Division's action against Davis's license to practice medicine does
not fall within any of the exceptions listed in subsection (2) of
section 1 of UAPA.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2) (Supp. 1991).

Nor does the Declaratory Judgments Act make explicit reference to
Chapter 46b.

Thus, in plain and unambiguous terms, UAPA provides

the exclusive means for judicial review of the Division's action
against Davis's license.
The procedure
sections 14 and 16.

for such review is

set

forth

in

UAPA

Section 16, applying to formal adjudicative

proceedings such as the Division's disciplinary proceedings against
2

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to UAPA are to the
version in effect in December 1991 when Davis filed his complaint
herein. Various provisions have since been amended, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5, -1, -15, -22 (Supp. 1992), but none of the
amendments affect UAPA's application in this case.

6

Davis, states that

,f

[a]s provided by statute, the Supreme Court or

the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings•M

While

section 16 itself is not a grant of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann, §
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals
over
the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies . . • , except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of
State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, and
the state engineer.
And, jurisdiction over "formal adjudicative proceedings originating
with" the agencies not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals is conferred on the Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(e) (1992).
In granting the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
exclusive jurisdiction to review formal adjudicative proceedings of
administrative agencies, the legislature expressly contemplated
constitutional challenges such as those Davis attempted to raise in
this case.

Section 63-46b-16(4) provides:

The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or
rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
* * *

(e) the agency has engaged in an
unlawful procedure or decision-making process,
or has failed to follow the prescribed
procedure,

7

(f) the persons taking the agency action
were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking
body
or
were
subject
to
disqualification ?
•

(h)

*

*

the agency action is:
* * *

(iv) otherwise arbitrary and
capricious.
(emphasis added).

The above provisions encompass all three of the

grounds on which Davis alleged the Division proceedings would
violate his due process rights.

The alleged bias of the director

(a claim Davis concedes was mooted by the director's recusal of
himself

from

the

subsection 4(f).

Division

proceedings3)

is

reviewable

under

The alleged concentration of investigative,

prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers in the Director would be
addressed under subsection 4(a) or (e). The alleged lack of notice
that the Division considered him in violation of the terms of his
probation would be reviewed under 4(a), (e) or (h)(iv).
Thus, UAPA clearly intended that challenges to agency
proceedings such as that Davis attempted to make in the district
court be brought only by appeal from a final agency order to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The district court properly
dismissed Davis's complaint.
Davis's contention that this case meets the requirements
for waiver of the exhaustion requirement under UAPA section 14(2)
is unavailing.

First, whether or not section 14(2) requires Davis

exhaust all administrative remedies available to him, under the
provisions of UAPA discussed above, a direct appeal from the agency
3

R. 105.
8

proceedings to the appropriate appellate court remains the only
means

for

obtaining

judicial

review

proceedings of a state agency.

of

formal

adjudicative

UAPA restricts the reach of the

Declaratory Judgments Act whether or not there exists an additional
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies. Thus, whether,
once

a final

order has been

issued

by the agency,

further

administrative proceedings must be completed before Davis may
obtain judicial review, is irrelevant here.

Compare Hi-Countrv

Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 passim
(Utah 1989) (dismissing petition for review of final order of PSC
for lack of jurisdiction where petitioner failed to seek rehearing
in PSC) with Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 462-64
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (appeal of DOPL order to Executive Director of
Department of Commerce not a prerequisite to review by Court of
Appeals).

Indeed, in arguing that UAPA section 14 does not require

exhaustion, Davis effectively concedes that UAPA controls his
claims.
To the extent interlocutory judicial review of agency
proceedings is permitted under UAPA/ the proper forum for such
review would still be in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, not
the district

court.

Indeed,

in a related

A

case, Davis has

The appellate courts have jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals from agency adjudicative proceedings under Utah Code Ann.
SS 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) and 78-2-2(3)(e) (1992). Such appeals are
granted only as a matter of discretion under Rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, where the order sought to be reviewed
"involves substantial rights and may materially affect the final
decision or that a determination of the correctness of the order
before final judgment will better serve the interests of justice.
U. R. App. P. 5(e).

9

petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the Division's denial
of his motion to certify as final its order denying his motion to
dismiss*

See Davis v. Div. of Occupational and Professional

Licensing, No. 920482-CA.

Ironically, choosing instead to pursue

this appeal, Davis has not sought interlocutory review of the
Division's order denying his motion to dismiss, which was made on
the same grounds Davis seeks to raise in this action.
While UAPA does not grant authority to certify an order
as final for purposes of review, it does contemplate a stay of the
administrative proceedings during the pendency of judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18(l) (1989).

Where the agency denies a

motion for such a stay, the court may grant the stay upon finding
either that the agency has violated its own rules in denying the
stay or that the following four criteria are met:
(i) the party seeking judicial review is
likely to prevail on the merits when the court
finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review
will
suffer
irreparable
injury without
immediate relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party
seeking review will not substantially harm
other parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health,
safety, or welfare relief upon by the agency
is not sufficiently serious to justify the
agency's action under the circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18(4)(b) (1989).

Davis's suggestion that

the above requirements may be avoided simply by proceeding in
district court under the Declaratory Judgment Act and seeking
injunctive relief is untenable.
10

Even the Supreme Court and the

Court of Appeals are required to comply with the requirements of
UAPA in reviewing agency adjudicative proceedings.

See Utah Code

Ann. §§ 78-2-2(6) (1992) and 78-2a-3(4) (1992).
As the Court of Appeals has acknowledged, UAPA intended
to divest the district courts of their prior role as intermediate
appellate courts except in informal adjudicative proceedings. See
In re Tooik, 761 P.2d 32, 33 n.3 (Utah Ct. App- 1988), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). Davis's attempt to resolve issues
relating to formal adjudicative proceedings of the Division by
collateral attack in the district courts would frustrate that
intent.
To support his declaratory judgment action, Davis cites
to several Utah cases in which claims against administrative
agencies were addressed by an action for declaratory relief. None
of those cases are apposite here.

In Utah Restaurant Ass'n v.

Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160-61 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme for judicial review
did not apply since the agency action at issue was a rulemaking,
rather than an adjudicative proceeding. Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah
2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956), was a pre-UAPA case and did not
involve adjudicatory proceedings or a statutorily-prescribed means
of judicial review.

Similarly, Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt

Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949) and Backman v. Salt
Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962), were both preUAPA cases, did not involve adjudicatory proceedings or other
proceedings for which there was a specific statutory scheme for
11

judicial review, and indeed did not even involve administrative
agencies of the state.

Moreover, neither Phi Kappa Iota nor

Backman even addressed the issue of whether relief was properly
sought in the district court by action for declaratory relief.
Contrary to the implication Davis attempts to draw from
the above cases, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that
"[w]here an appeal from an action of an administrative body is
provided by statute, a remedy by way of declaratory judgment will
be denied.

The proper procedure to challenge the statute and the

administration

thereof

is

by

judicial

administrative action has been taken."

review

after

final

Baird v. State, 574 P. 2d

713, 718 (Utah 1978).
Hciving granted the statutory right to obtain declaratory
relief, it was within the prerogative of the legislature to
restrict that right in the context of administrative proceedings.
Construing section 63-46b-l(l) according to its plain meaning, UAPA
provides

the

exclusive

means

of

judicial

review

of

formal

adjudicatory proceedings of the Division by appeal from a final
order to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.

For that reason,

the district court properly dismissed Davis's complaint.
POINT II
EVEN IF UAPA WERE NOT THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REQUIRING
DAVIS TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
The district

court

also properly

dismissed

complaint under the doctrine of exhaustion of
12

Davis's

administrative

remedies.

As Davis correctly points out in his brief, whether a

party should be required to exhaust administrative remedies is a
purely discretionary decision.

Davis Brief at 14-15.

Under the

circumstances of this case, where a formal adjudicative proceeding
was

(and still is) pending against Davis, the district court

properly exercised that discretion not to interfere with those
proceedings.
The burden is on the party seeking collateral review of
an administrative proceeding to establish a basis for waiving the
exhaustion requirement.

Honio v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988);

Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 1986); Park 'N Flv
of San Francisco, Inc. v. City of So. San Francisco, 188 Cal. App.
3d 1201, 234 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).

Here, Davis

has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating a basis for
excusing him from the exhaustion requirement.
A.

Davis's
Administrative
Remedies
Include
Judicial Review of His Constitutional Claims
and Are Therefore Adequate

Davis first contends that the exhaustion requirement
should be waived because the Division lacks jurisdiction to decide
the constitutional questions raised in his district court complaint
and therefore his administrative remedies are inadequate.

As the

Utah Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office,
621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980), however,
the mere introduction of a constitutional
issue does not obviate the need for exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
As stated in
Public Utilities, "if . • .an administrative
proceeding might leave no remnant of the
constitutional question, the administrative
13

remedy plainly should be pursued."
621 P.2d at 1237 (Utah 1980), citing Public Utilities Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958), rehearing denied, 356
U.S. 925 (1958).
Davis attempts to distinguish Johnson on the ground that
the

plaintiffs

there

were

seeking

recovery

contributions made by their employer and

of

retirement

"were not facing an

unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of
law, as is Davis." Davis Brief at 13. This assertion assumes too
much.

In claiming that "only constitutional issues have been

raised" here, Davis Brief at 14, Davis fails to recognize that the
Division proceedings he seeks to enjoin undoubtedly will address
numerous other issues. Notably, Davis does not assert that he will
not contest the charges of unprofessional conduct brought against
him other than on the constitutional grounds he has attempted to
raise here.

Thus, a possible outcome of the Division proceedings

is that Davis will be absolved of the charges and thus will not
suffer a deprivation of a property interest at all.

In that case,

his constitutional issues will be mooted.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Aircraft
S Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 772 (1947), M[T]he
very fact that constitutional issues are put forward constitutes a
strong reason for not allowing this suit either to anticipate or
take the place of the Tax Court's final performance of its
function.

When that has been done, it is possible that nothing

will be left of appellant's claim . . . ."
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See also Public

Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. at 539-40 (M[i]f • . .
an

administrative

proceeding

might

leave

no

remnant

of

the

constitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly should
be pursued").

This is consistent with the policy of exercising

judicial restraint to avoid reaching constitutional questions,
State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7 (Utah filed Jan. 7,
1993), or disposing of matters in piecemeal fashion. Kennedy v. New
Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535-37 (Utah 1979) (discussing
final judgment rule).
Davis's further assertion that the Division proceedings
"would add nothing to an adjudication of the facial validity of the
statutes," Davis Brief at 14, is completely unsupported by any
legal analysis.

Contrary to this assertion, where a statutorily-

prescribed means of judicial review of the constitutional claims is
provided, as in this case, a facial constitutional challenge cannot
be used to evade the administrative process.

In Gaunce v. De

Vincentis, 708 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
978

(1983), for example, the court of appeals held that the

district

court

lacked

jurisdiction

to

review

a

facial

constitutional challenge to an Federal Aviation Administration
proceeding to revoke a pilot's Airman Certificate.

In so holding,

the court stated:
The statutorily prescribed requirements
cannot be dispensed with merely because the
administrative proceeding dealt with an
agency's
proof
of
specified
regulatory
violations, while appellant is raising a due
process constitutional claim in the judicial
proceeding. So long as effective means for
judicial review are ultimately available where
15

the constitutional claims can be raised,
appellant
may
not
dispense
with
the
requirement of prior administrative review,
otherwise judicial review would be an abstract
process,
"It is not axiomatic
that
challenging the constitutionality of a statute
on its face as opposed to its application will
permit a litigant to bypass the administrative
process since under cases such as this '[t]he
effect would be that important and difficult
constitutional questions would be decided
devoid of factual content.'"
708 F.2d at 1293 (emphasis added). See also W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v.
Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967), rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 319 (1968),
(affirming dismissal of complaint challenging constitutionality of
Subversive Activities Control Act on its face under the first
amendment where constitutional issue could be raised on appeal from
board to court of appeals).
Here, not only may Davis raise his constitutional claims
on

direct

appeal

from

the

Division

proceedings,

there

is

considerable variation in the manner in which the challenged
statutes may be applied. For example, the Director's recusal from
the adjudicative proceedings in response to Davis's allegations of
bias has not only mooted the bias claim, but in all likelihood has
also

mooted

Davis's

claim

that

the

Director

is

granted

an

unconstitutional combination of investigative, prosecutorial and
adjudicative powers. Thus, allowing the Division proceedings to go
forward to completion will considerably assist appellate review by
precisely framing the constitutional question presented.5
Davis relies on Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
5

See also discussion in Point II.B. below concerning Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
16

57

(1972),

to

contend

that

he is entitled

adjudication in the first instance.

to an

impartial

Ward, however, addressed

criminal traffic violation proceedings in which the plaintiff
contended that the judicial officer, the mayor of the city whose
revenues were derived from traffic fines, was biased. Here, Davis
has conceded that his bias claim has been mooted by the Director's
recusal.
inadequate

Moreover, in Ward, the administrative remedy deemed
was

not

direct

appellate

review,

but

a

de

novo

proceeding before an impartial judicial officer followed ultimately
by appellate review.

Under the statutory scheme in Ward., the

constitutional adequacy of the first adjudication would never be
reached because it was superseded by a de novo review. As noted by
the United States Supreme Court in that case, "there is nothing to
suggest that the incentive to convict would be diminished by the
possibility of reversal on appeal."

409 U.S. at 61.

Unlike the

scheme in Ward, the administrative procedure here establishes
direct appellate review of the initial adjudicative proceeding.
Thus,

any

constitutional

error

in

the

initial

adjudicative

proceedings will be corrected and the agency has substantial
incentive to protect the viability of its adjudications by avoiding
reversible error. Davis's broad interpretation of the language in
Ward to mandate review of constitutional claims before the initial
adjudicative proceedings are held is incorrect and cannot be
squared with Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752
(1947) and W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967),
rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 319 (1968).
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See also Gaunce v. De

Vincentis, 708 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied and appeal
dismissed, 464 U.S. 978 (1983).
Nor does either Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen, 194
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. August 20, 1992), or Hatton-Ward
v. Salt Lake City, 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), support
Davis's contention that he should not be required to exhaust his
constitutional claims. In Parkdale, the Court of Appeals held only
that the plaintiff's breach of contract and wrongful termination of
employment claims lay completely outside the scope of Industrial
Commission proceedings.

194 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.

Similarly,

Hatton-Ward held that the plaintiff's claim under the WhistleBlower

statute

Commission.

was

outside

the

scope

of

the

Civil

Service

In so holding, the Court of Appeals specifically noted

that judicial review from Commission proceedings was restricted to
whether the Commission exceeded its discretion and authority.

828

P.2d at 1074. Thus, the plaintiff's Whistle Blower claims were not
reviewable even on appeal from Commission proceedings.
Unlike the claims in Parkdale and Hatton-Ward, Davis's
claims arise directly from the administrative proceedings and are
properly addressed only on direct appeal from those proceedings.6
6

Several other cases relied upon by Davis are distinguishable
on the same basis. In Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1985), the court found that the plaintiff's claims
fell completely outside the purview of any administrative agency
and thus were not reviewable even on direct appeal from an agency
decision. In Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990),
the court held that the very statutes that the plaintiff challenged
in a declaratory judgment action expressly prohibited his use of
the administrative procedures the defendants argued the plaintiff
was required to exhaust. Moreover, the court did not even address
whatever procedures, if any, were available for judicial review by
18

To permit a collateral attack on the Division proceedings would not
simply provide relief not available through the agency as Davis
contends,

it

would

substantially

impede

the

fulfilling its legislatively-established mission.

Division

from

The district

court properly dismissed Davis's complaint for failure to exhaust
the administrative remedy of direct judicial review from a final
agency order.7
B.

The Public Interest In Going Forward With The
Disciplinary
Process
Far
Outweighs
The
Potential Harm To Davis From Reguiring
Exhaustion

The public interest in going forward with the proceedings
against Davis far outweighs any potential harm to Davis from

direct appeal from the agency ruling.
In Collopv v* Wildlife
Comm'n, 625 P. 2d 994 (Colo. 1981), the court held that no
administrative process even existed for review of the plaintiff's
claim that wildlife regulations had caused a taking of his property
without just compensation.
7

The other cases Davis relies upon are also inapposite for
various reasons. Gibson v. Berrvhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) and
National Advertising Co* v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1990) both involved civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
The exhaustion doctrine does not even apply to § 1983 claims. See
411 U.S. at 574. McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1979), involved a direct appeal from a final agency order, not a
collateral attack on pending adjudicative proceedings. In Vargas
v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 831 F.2d
906 (9th Cir. 1987), the court applied the exhaustion doctrine to
deny review of the plaintiff's constitutional claims. In Farrokhi
v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 900 F.2d
697 (4th Cir. 1990), the court specifically declined to rule on the
exhaustion issue because the constitutional issues raised had no
merit in any event. Significantly, in McGrath v. Weinberger, 541
F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, McGrath v. Califano, 430
U.S. 933 (1977), no pending administrative proceeding was disrupted
by collateral review.
Moreover, McGrath would not permit
collateral review of all constitutional questions, but only those
involving the "constitutional applicability of legislation to
particular facts." 541 F.2d at 251.
19

requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies.
First, substantially all of the harm Davis attributes to
the proceedings, i.e., the adverse publicity and damage to his
professional

reputation

proceedings

themselves

and
and

practice,
does

not

violations of his due process rights.

is
flow

inherent

in

from

alleged

any

the

Davis's constitutional

claims challenge only certain aspects of the process by which the
Division

will

conduct

its

proceedings

against

Division's basic right to bring those proceedings.

him,

not

the

As stated by

United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1938):
the
rule
requiring
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies cannot be circumvented
by asserting that the charge on which the
complaint rests is groundless and that the
mere holding of the prescribed administrative
hearing would result in irreparable damage.
Lawsuits also often prove to have been
groundless; but no way has been discovered of
relieving a defendant from the necessity of a
trial to establish the fact.
Thus, Davis has no right not to have the proceedings brought and
the charges made against him.
Moreover, as conceded by Davis in his brief, he is
currently subject to federal criminal proceedings arising from
essentially the same conduct that is the subject of the Division's
proceedings

against

him.

Upon Davis's motion,

the Division

proceedings have been indefinitely stayed at least until the
schedule trial date in the criminal prosecution in April 1993. R.
193-200.
Division,

If Davis is prosecuted before a hearing is held by the
as

appears

likely,

he will
20

already

have

incurred

substantially all of whatever adverse publicity and damage to his
professional reputation and practice otherwise would have been
caused by the Division proceedings.
appeal

from

the

Division

In arguing that a direct

proceedings

is

inadequate,

Davis

characterizes that harm as "irreparable" and "irreversible," Davis
Brief at 12 & 13; thus, even the possibility of an acquittal in the
federal prosecution will not undo the harm stemming
prosecution itself.

from the

Davis has not explained how the Division

proceedings will inflict any substantial harm to his reputation or
practice not already and inevitably visited upon him by the
criminal proceedings.
In addition, the constitutional claims Davis attempted to
raise below are palpably weak.8 As Davis has already conceded, the
first of his three counts, alleging bias of the Division director,
was mooted by the Director's recusal.

R. 105.

That recusal also moots any substantial constitutional
question concerning the exercise of investigative, prosecutorial
and adjudicatory powers by the director.
was

conducted

and

the

resulting

Since the investigation

petition

against

Davis was

initiated under the supervision of a person who will not be
involved in the remaining proceedings, there is no significant
merging of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative power.
8

Davis failed to address this consideration in his opening
brief, implying that this Court must take his allegation of a due
process violation as true for purposes of reviewing the district
court's dismissal of his claims. Davis Brief at vii n.l. The
allegation of a due process violation is not, however, a factual
claim. Rather, it is a conclusion of law subject to challenge on
a motion to dismiss.
21

Even if Davis's second count against the Division were
not mooted by the director's recusal, Davis's broad, conclusory
allegation

of

a

facial

constitutional

violation

would

be

insufficient to justify waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Both
of the cases on which Davis relies actually rejected similar
constitutional claims. See Wi throw v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975);
In re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986).

As acknowledged by the

United States Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52
(1975), "'[tjhe case law, both federal and state, generally rejects
the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating
functions is a denial of due process, '" citing 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02, p. 175 (1958).
Indeed, in Withrow v. Larkin, the United States Supreme
Court effectively foreclosed a facial challenge to the combination
of powers in an administrative agency or agency head, noting that
the internal organization of an agency "may minimize the risks
arising from combining investigation and adjudication," 421 U.S. at
54 n. 20, and stating, "That the combination of investigative and
adjudicative* functions does not, without more, constitute a due
process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from
determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the
case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high."
421 U.S. at

58

(emphasis added).

See also Chemical Waste

Management, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 873
F.2d

1477, 1484

(D.C. Cir.

1989)

(relying

upon Withrow in

dismissing a facial challenge to agency's combined powers).
22

Cf.

Crawford v. Tillev, 780 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Utah 1989) (statutes are
to be construed so as to avoid constitutional defects).
Here, it remains to be seen how the statutory grant of
power to the Division director will be applied in the Division
proceedings against Davis* Although, as agency head, the director
wields supervisory authority over the Division's investigative,
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, he certainly has the
authority to delegate to others the direct responsibility for
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative decisions

in an

individual case. Indeed, such a delegation will necessarily occur
as

a result

of

the director's

proceedings against Davis.

recusal

of

himself

from the

Thus, Davis has failed to frame any

substantial due process question concerning the combination of
powers exercised by the director in the Division proceedings
against Davis.
Davis's third due process claim is likewise meritless.
Davis complains that he was given no notice that the Division
considered him in violation of his probation before that charge was
formally initiated before the Board.

Davis does not dispute,

however, that he has been given notice of the formal adjudicatory
proceedings before the Board and that he will be given the
opportunity to dispute that charge before the Board determines that
issue.

Davis cites no authority for the proposition that he was

entitled to notice that the Division found a basis on which to
charge him with probation violations before those charges were
brought.

Again, Davis has failed to pose any substantial due
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process question.

See, e.g. , Metropolitan Dade County v. Dep't of

Commerce, 365 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (to avoid
exhaustion requirement, plaintiff must do more than "hint" at
constitutional issue).
While Davis will not suffer any substantial harm from
being required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the public
interest in going forward with the proceedings against Davis is
strong.

To the extent the Division proceedings are subject to

collateral

attack, the Division

is hampered

from effectively

fulfilling its vital role of enforcing standards of professional
conduct.

'" [E]xhaustion principles apply with special force when

'frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes'
could weaken an agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of
its procedures."
1081, 1086 (1992).
Division

McCarthy v. Madiqan,

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct.

Davis's own persistent attempts to derail the

proceedings

against

him

demonstrate

this

principle.

Moreover, the charges involved in this particular proceeding are
serious in nature and the public interest requires that they be
resolved in as expeditious a manner as possible consistent with
fairness. On balance, the public interest is far better served by
requiring Davis to raise his constitutional challenges by direct
appellate review of the proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Administrative
exclusive

means

for

judicial

Procedures Act provides the

review

of

formal

adjudicative

proceedings of state agencies by direct appeal to an appellate
24

court. Even if the district court had discretion to review Davis's
claim, however, it properly exercised that discretion to require
Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies. The statutory scheme
for judicial review of agency orders provides an adequate means of
reviewing Davis's constitutional claims. Davis will not suffer any
substantial irreparable harm from being required to raise those
claims on direct appeal from an agency order and the public
interest in going forward with the disciplinary proceedings far
outweighs any harm caused to Davis by requiring exhaustion.
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J-£^day of February, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

DEBRA J. MOORE
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter [Effective
until April 1, 1992].
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided
by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state of
Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend,
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of all such actions.
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern:
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency rules, or the judicial
review of those procedures or rules;
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax,
the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of, and
penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment,
except that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action commenced by a taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest
the validity or correctness of those actions;
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the re-
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scission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge,
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or
the treatment of, inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the
Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in
the custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions;
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational institution, or judicial review of those actions;
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions;
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Chapter 9, Title 35,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, except that the provisions of this
chapter govern any agency action commenced by the employer or other
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of such a
citation or assessment;
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, and
contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies,
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for an agency of the state,
except as provided in such contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Article 3, Chapter 1, Title 7, Powers and
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and Chapters 2,8a, and
19, Title 7, and Chapter 30, Title 63, Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
or judicial review of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for
benefits under Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, or the initial determination of a
person's unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Chapter 8,11,
12, 13, or 14, Title 26, except that the provisions of this chapter govern
any agency action commenced by any person authorized by law to contest
the validity or correctness of any such notice or order;
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government
or public assistance benefits, or the right of any person to obtain documents or information from an agency;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and
certificates of registration; and
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities.
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any legal remedies otherwise
available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.

63-46b-l
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that
the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section.
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Chapter 46a,
Title 63, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to
the requirements of this chapter.
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency
of the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions
to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the
denial. The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at
its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial
review.

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered

to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a k e s the act effective on January 1,
^933

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, & 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
other appellate court designated by statute" in
Subsection (1); inserted vwith the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary
remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its
order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies
unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties
and shall specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not
granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the
public health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the
merits when the court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury
without immediate relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substantially harm other parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon
by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action
under the circumstances.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-18, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 274.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DAVID,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 910907449 CV

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al.,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:

This matter is now before the Court is defendants' Motion
to Dismiss.

The Court has reviewed

the memos submitted

in

connection with said Motion, has heard oral argument, has taken
the matter under advisement and now rules as follows:
A substantial portion of this Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief has been rendered moot by defendant David
E.

Robinson's

further
What

proceedings

remains

statutes

recusal

of

himself

in this matter

is estentially

under

from

which

the

participating

involving

a constitutional
Division

of

in any

the plaintiff.
attack

on

Occupational

the
and

Professional Licensing and the Utah Medical Licensing Board is

proceeding against plaintiff.
is

whether

the
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plaintiff

The narrow issue before the Court

can,

during

the

pendency

of

the

administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory and
injunctive

relief

against

the

agency

involved

statute under which they are proceeding

claiming

the

is unconstitutional.

Defendants claim that this issue can be decided by the Court of
Appeals

in

the

proper

manner

after

the

hearing,

and

that

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff

relies

primarily

on

Ward

v.

Village

of

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) and Utah Restaurant Association
v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P2d 1159 (Utah, 1985).
should

It

be noted, however, that neither of those cases deal

specifically

with the

issue

of

exhaustion

of

administrative

remedies.
Both

parties

cite

Johnson

Office, 621 P2d 1234 (Utah, 1980) .

v.

Utah

State

Retirement

That case however did rule

that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
dismissed the matter referring it back to the administrative
agency for further hearing.

The Court said in that case:

"Plaintiff's assertion of a constitutional issue does
not alter the necessity for compliance with the
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before
the Retirement Board....As stated in Pulic Utilities...
11
If...an administrative proceeding might leave no
remnant of the constitutional question the administrative
remedy plainly should be pursued."11
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The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff should pursue
his remedies in the administrative proceeding and if it becomes
necessary to address the constitutional issue then it can be
done so in the appropriate manner.
Accordingly defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent
with this ruling and submit it for signature in accordance the

:

the local rules of practice.
DATED this

1

day of March, 1992.

2^
FRANK G. NO
DISTRICT COWRT^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
1

Decision,

postage

day of March, 1992:

Peter Stirba
Elizabeth J. Buchanan
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
23 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

prepaid,

to

the

R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
DAN R. LARSEN - 4865
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 53 8-1016
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
DAVID E. ROBINSON, in his
individual capacity as
Director of the Division
of Occupational &
Professional Licensing of
the Department of Business
Regulation, and the
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING at
the Department of Business
Regulation, State of Utah,
and the UTAH MEDICAL
LICENSING BOARD, and R.
PAUL VAN DAM, in his
capacity as Attorney
General for the State of
Utah,

Civil No.

910907449CV

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing
before the Court on February 28, 1992, at 9:00 a.m.

Plaintiff

was represented by Peter Stirba; defendants were represented by
Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General.

Having heard and

considered the arguments of counsel, together with the

memorandums of law, and having filed a Memorandum Decision on
March 4, 1992, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as
follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted for the

reasons stated in the Memorandum Decision.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this -^ Oday of

N,( > v, £

{

y

BY THE COURT:

1992.
^sss=^r>>.

FRANK G. NOEEi -V '

District Court"Judge

^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, postage
prepaid, this

/.—-

day of March, 1992, to the following:

Peter Stirba
Elizabeth J. Buchanan
Stirba & Hathaway
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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